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1. In the “Sentence-Relativity” section of his comments, Comesaña 
discusses my attempt (in the “Relativity to Sentences” section of my 
paper) to convince readers that there cannot be two different sentences 
that say the same thing but only one of which counts as self-evident 
according to my definition (D1-prelim). In his discussion of this in his 
comments at the Lehrer conference1, he suggested (as he reports here) 
that there is a less involved (and more demonstrative) argument to 
the desired conclusion, namely, the following argument (as he puts it 
here):
“if p satisfies the definiens of [(D1-prelim)], that means that every subject 
that fully understands p believes what p says, and if q says the same 
thing as p, then every subject who fully understands q also believes what 
q says, for he believes what p says, and q says the very same thing. It 
is impossible, then, for two sentences to be such that they say the same 
thing and yet only one of them satisfies the definiens of (D1) – impossible 
as a matter of logic, regardless of what we mean by ‘full understanding’ 
and ‘what a sentence says’.”2
It seemed to me that this argument somehow fails to address 
what was really worrying me about the relativity to sentences of my 
(preliminary) definition of self-evidence. This led me in footnote 3 of the 
new version of my paper to formulate and rebut what I thought was   
essentially the same argument as the one Comesaña suggests. I now   
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see (what, I’m embarrassed to confess, should not have been hard to 
see) that I was wrong in this last thought. The defective argument I 
consider in footnote 3 is not the same as Comesaña’s argument and in 
fact there is nothing wrong with Comesaña’s argument. That argument 
turns solely on the assumption that if two sentences say the same thing 
then to believe what one of them says is to believe what the other says, 
an assumption I granted when stating the problem (and the argument 
does not turn, as my footnote 3 suggests, on the false assumption that 
if two sentences say the same thing then to understand what one of 
them says is to understand what the other says). It is clear, I now agree, 
that Comesaña’s argument does demonstrate that there cannot be two 
sentences that say the same thing but only one of them satisfies the 
definiens of my (D1-prelim).
But, having seen this, I still find myself with the suspicion that there 
is a problem with the relativity to sentences of my way of defining self-
evidence that is unaddressed by Comesaña’s argument. I now think 
I see where my worry really comes from. I have been reading into my 
definition something that is not explicitly there (and not implicitly there 
either, in any strict sense); and this merely understood bit does belong 
to the definition I really wanted to offer: I failed to adequately articulate 
my real thought. In the following revision of (D1-prelim) the previously 
merely understood part is in italics:
(D1-prelim*)  For any declarative sentence p whose meaning is such 
that what the sentence p says does not vary from one 
context of utterance to another, it is self-evident that p if 
and only if: the sentence p is such that, for any person S, 
if S understands what the sentence p says then it follows 
that S believes what p says, expressed that way.
By ‘S believes what p says, expressed that way’ I mean something 
for the truth of which it is necessary that either S believes that what p 
says is true, or in suitable circumstances S would sincerely assert the 
sentence p or would sincerely assent to another’s assertive use of that 
sentence.
The problem I was worried about does arise for (D1-prelim*). It does 
need to be the case that it is not possible for p and q to say the same thing 
and yet p satisfies (D1-prelim*) and q does not. If this were possible then 
what p says would be self-evident and what q says would not be self-
evident, even though what p says is identical with what q says. But the 
sort of argument Comesaña suggests can’t show this to be impossible. 
This is because ‘S believes what p says, expressed that way’ (unlike ‘S C. Ginet – Reply to Comesaña
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believes what p says’) is an intensional context (as is ‘S believes that 
what p says is true’). So, even if ‘what p says’ and ‘what q says’ refer to 
the same thing, ’S believes what p says, expressed that way’ does not 
entail ‘S believes what q says, expressed that way’. S may believe what 
p says, expressed that way, but fail to believe what q says, expressed 
that way, because she fails to understand what q says. So a different 
sort of argument is needed. The sort I gave in my section “Relativity to 
Sentences” will fill the bill, I think, as well for (D1-prelim*) as it does for 
(D1-prelim).
2. In my footnote 3 I claim that ‘S understands what p says’ entails ‘S 
knows some truth of the form “What p says is that r”.’ Comesaña finds 
two problems with this claim.
2.1  First, he thinks it is false. He says:
“it seems to me that, as we ordinarily use the term ‘understand,’ to 
know a truth of the form ‘What p says is that r’ may be needed in order 
to understand the sentence p, but surely not in order to understand 
what p says. Thus, a monolingual Japanese speaker understands what 
the sentence snow is white says, although he doesn’t understand the 
sentence snow is white.”3
It seems to me that Comesaña is just wrong here about how we 
ordinarily use the term “understand” in English. A monolingual speaker 
of Japanese does not understand what the sentence ‘snow is white’ 
says, or what any English sentence says. Suppose that S is a monolingual 
Japanese speaker who believes that snow is white; and suppose that 
S is looking at a sheet on which is written the English sentence “Snow 
is white” and is looking puzzled. If I point to the sentence and say, “He 
does not understand what that sentence says”, I surely speak the truth. 
My claim does not invoke a special technical sense of “understand” 
but is in accord with the ordinary use of the word. And if I go on to say, 
“but he believes what that sentence says”. I also speak the truth. So, 
although ‘S believes what p says’ does not entail ‘S knows some truth of 
the form “p says that r”’, ‘S understands what p says’ does entail this. 
‘S understands what p says’ provides an intensional context for ‘what p 
says’, but ‘S believes what p says’ does not. Why is there that difference 
between ‘understand’ and ‘believe’? It’s hard to say. But it is the way 
those words are used.
3  Id. ibid., p. 42.C. Ginet – Reply to Comesaña
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2.2  Comesaña’s second problem with my claim that ‘S understands 
what p says’ entails ‘S knows some truth of the form “What p says is 
that r”’ is that “if self-evidence is… understood in terms of knowing 
truths regarding what sentences say, then we are explaining this kind 
of a priori knowledge in terms of a posteriori knowledge.” It is true that, 
on my account, S’s being justified by self-evidence in believing that p 
requires S to know, with respect to some sentence that says that p, what 
that sentence says, and that knowledge is indeed a posteriori. I affirm 
(in my section “Self-Evidence is Non-Inferential A Priori Justification”) 
that if it is self-evident to S that p then the fact that constitutes S’s being 
justified in believing that p is simply the fact that she fully understands, 
i.e., knows, what p (or some other sentence that says that p) says. But, 
as I assert there,
“this sort of justification is clearly a priori (if any is). It certainly satisfies 
any plausible negative constraint on a priori justification: it is not 
justification by sense perception or by introspection; nor is it by inference 
ultimately from perceptual or introspective beliefs. Indeed, the only 
experience [or a posteriori knowledge] that justification by self-evidence 
requires of its subject is whatever was needed in order to fully understand 
what the sentence in question says, and that is no reason to deny that 
the justification is a priori.”4
I say a bit more about this in my reply to Hetherington.
3. According to Comesaña, in the argument of my “Relativity to 
Sentences” section I commit myself to the claim that “if two sentences 
(A) and (B) are such that it is possible for anyone to fully understand 
them and yet adopt different doxastic attitudes towards them then they 
do not say the same thing.” It is not clear here what Comesaña means 
by “doxastic attitudes towards” sentences. Presumably to believe a 
sentence p is more than merely to believe that p. Perhaps it is to believe 
that p, expressed that way. So understood, he is right: I did commit 
myself to that claim. He offers two putative counterexamples to this 
claim.
The first is the pair of sentences ‘1+1=2’ in decimal notation and   
‘1+1 = 10’ in binary notation; the first says (in English) that one one 
plus one one equals one two and the second says that one one plus 
one one equals one two plus zero ones. He remarks that “insofar as it 
seems plausible to consider someone (however irrational) who fully 
understands both sentences and yet believes only one of them, we are   
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forced to conclude that they say different things”, and I take it that he finds   
this conclusion unacceptable. But I do not: it seems to me that they do 
say different things. But it also seems to me that what each of them 
says is self-evident (in the sense of (D1-prelim) and (D1-prelim*)), so 
that it would not be possible to fully understand both but believe only   
one.
Comesaña’s other putative counterexample – the pair of sentences 
“London is pretty” and “Londres est jolie – really is a counterexample. 
Those two sentences do say the same thing and yet, as Kripke’s example 
of Pierre makes clear, it is possible to fully understand both but believe 
one of them and not the other, because one does not know that they 
say the same thing, because one does not know that “London” and 
“Londre” name the same city. As I’ve said, I did suggest the claim that 
this last example counters, but on reflection it seems to me that I need 
have committed myself only to the more restricted claim that if p and q 
say the same thing and what they say is self-evident (in my sense), then 
no one could fully understand both p and q but believe only what p says 
(expressed that way) and not what q says (expressed that way). And 
this claim still seems to me to be true. It is true even for cases satisfying 
this description where S does not know that p and q say the same thing, 
e.g., where p is “If London is pretty then London is pretty” and q is “Se 
Londres est jolie alors Londres est jolie”.
But in the same section I hazard another claim on this subject that 
reflection on the Kripke example shows me I should take back. I say, “In 
general, if two sentences do say the same thing, then anyone who fully 
understands both sentences must see that they say the same thing.” 
This claim can also be shown false by sentences that use directly 
referring terms, like proper names or demonstratives. Consider the pair of 
sentences mentioned at the end of the last paragraph: “If London is pretty 
then London is pretty” and “Se Londres est jolie alors Londres est jolie”. 
These say the same thing, a thing that is self-evident by my definition. 
Yet someone who mistakenly thinks that “London” and “Londres” name 
different cities will mistakenly think that those sentences say different 
things; and yet such a person might know what city “London” names and 
also what city “Londres” names, by, e.g., having been directly acquainted 
with the city under that name. Will restricting the generalization by 
making exceptions of sentences that contain such directly referring 
terms – saying that if two sentences say the same thing then anyone 
who fully understands both sentences must see that they say the same 
thing, unless the sentences contain different directly referring terms that 
have the same referent – make it true? I think so but I cannot explore 
that question here.C. Ginet – Reply to Comesaña
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4. At the end of his “Sentence Relativity” section Comesaña says that, 
according to me, “you don’t fully understand a sentence S unless you 
can recognize which of all the other sentences that you fully understand 
say the same thing as S. I wonder whether, according to Ginet, anyone 
ever fully understands a sentence.” He thinks that I’ve placed so heavy 
a demand on fully understanding a sentence that no one ever meets it. 
Presumably he would want to suggest the same about the more restricted 
generalization I propose at the end of the last paragraph. But I don’t 
see why he thinks this. The generalization requires only that anyone 
who fully understands a sentence (which satisfies the restriction), 
should he consider together that sentence and another sentence he fully 
understands (which satisfies the restriction) and the question whether 
they say the same thing, must judge that they do. It does not require that 
he must actually have done this for every pair of sentences belonging to 
a certain set of sentences before it can be said that he fully understands 
them all.
5. Comesaña  finds  problems  with  my  explicit  account  of  full 
understanding, specifically with my account of application competence 
for descriptive terms. I said that one has application competence for a 
term x if one is able to tell with respect to any candidate case, given 
enough relevant information about it, whether or not x applies to the 
case.  Comesaña rightly notes that we must be careful what we allow in 
the relevant information the subject considers. It must not, for example, 
include the information that x does (or does not) apply to the case 
along with information as to just what it is about the case that makes x 
apply (or not apply). But Comesaña says that it also must not “include 
information that entails that the candidate case is an x or not.” I am 
puzzled that he should say this, for it can’t be right. If a subject is to 
be able to demonstrate competence in applying the term, she must be 
allowed enough information about the case to determine whether the 
term applies and that is information sufficient to entail either that it does 
apply or that it doesn’t apply. Take the term “rhombus”, which applies to 
a plane figure just in case it has four equal sides and its opposite sides 
are parallel. Unless I am told, or allowed to observe, all those facts about 
a figure, I won’t be able to tell whether it’s a rhombus, no matter how 
well I understand the term, how competent I am in applying it.
Comesaña severely doubts that this account of application competence 
can work for natural-kind terms like “water” or “tree” or for terms that 
admit of borderline cases like “table”. And of course he is right. I 
acknowledge (in the last paragraph of my “Full Understanding” section) 
that the above account is not adequate for natural-kind terms, vague C. Ginet – Reply to Comesaña
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terms (or, I would add, any sort of term that admits of indeterminate 
cases), evaluative or essentially contestable terms, proper names (or, I 
would add, demonstratives or directly referential terms generally), and 
that for terms of these sorts (and no doubt others) it will be necessary to 
complicate in one way or another the account of application competence. 
I do not try to suggest how any of those complications should go; but 
of course a constraint on correct accounts of them is that they largely 
conform with our intuitions as to what should and should not count as 
cases of competence with a term (and that they not yield the dire result 
that hardly anyone has application competence for such terms or fully 
understands sentences containing them). Application competence for the 
natural-kind term “water”, for example, should not require knowing such 
a posteriori necessary truths as that water is H2O, but it should require 
knowing that whether “water” applies to something is not determined 
merely by its superficial appearance but also by its underlying nature. 
Someone who does not know this, who would be baffled at the suggestion 
that something superficially resembling water in all respects but having 
a radically different underlying nature is not water, does not understand 
the term “water” in the way we do. And application competence for a 
term admitting of indeterminate cases should, of course, not require the 
subject to know with respect to such cases (e.g., the case Comesano 
describes) whether or not the term applies, but rather to know that they 
are cases where the term does not clearly apply or not apply (and to 
know of clear cases that they are ones where the term clearly does or 
does not apply).
I did suggest that the account of application competence I gave 
(requiring the ability to tell with respect to any candidate case, given 
sufficient information about it, whether the term applies or not) is apt for 
many terms in mathematics (such as the terms “triangle”, “rhombus”, 
“right angle”, “Euclidean plane figure”, “three”, which appear in some 
of my sample sentences). Comesaña seems to doubt this and offers two 
reasons for his skepticism. The first he expresses this way:
“Take, for instance, two. In order to have application-competence with 
respect to two, do I have to know, of any candidate case, whether it is 
the number two or not? How would I go about doing that? (Do I have to 
solve one of the most difficult philosophical problems in order to have 
application-competence with respect to two?) Or do I have to know, of 
every candidate number of objects, whether they are two or not? In that 
case, the vagueness in the terms for the objects will infect two itself 
with vagueness.”5
5  See Juan Comesaña, Comments on Carl Ginet’s “Self-Evidence”, op. cit., p. 46.C. Ginet – Reply to Comesaña
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I think the second is the only plausible alternative here. And I don’t 
see that it would mean that the vagueness in terms for objects would 
infect “two” itself with vagueness. The requirement with respect to a 
numeral n (for an integer) would be the ability to determine with respect 
to a candidate set of Fs, each of which is determinately an F, whether the 
number of Fs in the set is n (or for a very large number of Fs, to know how 
in principle to go about determining whether the number is n).
Comesaña’s second reason for skepticism comes out in the following 
remarks:
“It still seems to me that many of the reasons why we favor a “more 
complicated” account of the notion of full understanding [and application 
competence] … for the case of, e.g., natural kind terms will apply also 
to mathematics and logic. For instance, if one is impressed by Putnam’s 
arguments regarding the linguistic division of labor, then surely that 
division of labor takes place as much (or more) in logic and mathematics 
as it does in botanic [sic].”6
It’s true that linguistic division of labor takes place in mathematics 
as well as in botany, but I don’t see why we should take that as a reason 
for supposing that my uncomplicated requirement for application-
competence won’t work for mathematical terms that are subject to such 
division of labor. Putnam’s point, I thought, was that in fact many us 
do not have application competence for terms like “beech” and “elm” 
and a great many other kind terms in the natural sciences, do not fully 
understand those terms; only certain experts do. And, of course, the same 
holds for many kind terms in mathematics. Many mathematicians fully 
understand what “regular topological space” means, but I (along with 
most non-mathematicians) don’t. There are therefore some self-evident 
propositions about regular topological spaces that are self-evident to 
those mathematicians but not to me. But there seems to me nothing 
surprising in that.
In the last section of his comments Comesaña expresses strong doubt 
that there are any sentences such that what they say is self-evident in 
my sense, such that fully understanding what they say entails believing 
it. He thinks that there could, for instance, be a case of someone who 
fully understands what “one plus one is two” says but does not believe 
it.  To produce a good reason for thinking that there can be such a case 
would, I think, to provide a description of one that makes it clear how 
it could be. I don’t think Comesaña has done that. He tells us that there 
could be someone who, while fully understanding what that sentence   
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says, does not believe it because he is irrational, or because he lacks the 
motivation or the capacity to believe it. But this seems simply to beg the 
question against the view that believing what that sentence says is (part 
of) what constitutes understanding it: one has to already assume that 
this view is false in order to suppose that fully understanding it leaves it 
still undetermined whether the subject believes it or not, leaves it open 
whether the subject has the “motivation” or rationality to believe it or 
the capacity to have the attitude of belief towards it.
He tells us that Hartry Field actually does fail to believe what the 
sentence “one plus one is two” says while fully understanding it. Being 
ill-acquainted with the details of Field’s views about the semantics of 
arithmetic, I am ill-equipped to say anything on the question whether 
Field’s views really commit him to disagreeing with us ordinary folk who 
in ordinary life go about affirming (what we take to be) arithmetic truths. 
But I would be astonished if Field did not occasionally manifest sincere 
belief in various arithmetic truths – for example, when adding up the 
restaurant tab or filling out his income tax forms – or, if he were asked to 
correct arithmetic tests of first-graders, he would summarily declare all 
of their answers wrong. It is the belief that one plus one is two (or that 
one plus one is not four) that any of us would manifest in such contexts 
that I am saying is part of what constitutes our understanding what the 
sentence “one plus one is two” says.